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Ethical Constraints on Judicial
Election Campaigns: A Review and
Critique of Canon 7
By JAtMs J. ALNNI* AND TERRENCE J. BROOKS**
INTRODUCTION
"The best justice(s) money can buy." Such a characterization
of a recent series of campaign contributions to justices of the
Supreme Court of Texas is difficult to resist. Representatives of
Texaco made campaign contributions totaling $72,700 to seven
justices while the appeal in the $11 billion Pennzoil lawsuit
against Texaco was pending before the court. Not to be outdone,
Pennzoil lawyers countered with campaign contributions of more
than $315,000. Moreover, three of the justices receiving Texaco
contributions and four of those receiving Pennzoil contributions
weren't even up for re-election.1
Practices such as these inevitably raise questions concerning
the integrity and impartiality of an elected judiciary. 2 Can a
judge resist the temptation to be influenced by such practices?
Even if a judge is able to maintain his or her integrity and
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University.
** Director, American Bar Association Division for Legal Services. Ethics advisory
opinions and unreported determinations and orders of state judicial conduct commissions
cited in this article are on file with the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations of
the American Judicature Society in Chicago.
I For a discussion of these events and similar judicial campaign practices in other
states, see What Price Justice? Oh, About $10,000, The Washington Post, May 17,
1987, at Cl, col. 1. See also Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State
Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J. L. & POL. 57, 58-
72, app. A, tables 1-7 (1985) (surveying and analyzing the substantial sums currently
devoted to the financing of judicial election campaigns).
2 A large number of state court judges are elected. Schotland, supra note 1, at
72-73, estimated that, in 1984, 7,424 state appellate and general jurisdiction trial court
judges were subject to elections in the thirty-nine states that elect some or all of their
judges in partisan, nonpartisan, or retention election campaigns.
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impartiality, will the judge's reputation still be open to question
and the public's confidence in the judiciary diminished?
Ethics codes for judges and lawyers attempt to reconcile the
perceived need for an elected judiciary with the general desire
for a judiciary of unquestioned integrity, independence, and
impartiality. In the notes to Canon 7 ("A Judge Should Refrain
from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office") of
the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct, the Reporter for the
drafting committee explained that the committee sought to deal
with the "tensions between the demands of political reality and
the necessity that a judge be impartial and appear to be impar-
tial." ' 3 He thus characterized the resulting subsections of Canon
7 as "compromises between political reality and the aim of
maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality." '4 Although
the Reporter did not elaborate on what was meant by "political
reality," we might assume that it included such basic aspects of
the electoral process as the notion that judicial candidates must
be allowed to develop the resources (funds) to present themselves
and their views to the electorate. We might then view the stric-
tures of Canon 7 and similar ethics provisions as seeking to
control judicial behavior during a political campaign in ways
that will assure 1) faithfulness to the electoral process, and 2)
judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality.
This article analyzes interpretations of relevant ethics provi-
sions from jurisdictions that elect their judiciaries to determine
the extent to which these regulations assist in 1) curbing judicial
election campaign excesses while ensuring faithfulness to the
electoral process, and 2) achieving the goal of an impartial
judiciary whose reputation is beyond reproach. Part I reviews
the ethics rules governing judicial election campaigns, and part
II identifies the agencies responsible for their interpretation and
enforcement. The case law and ethics advisory opinions5 inter-
preting these ethics rules are discussed and analyzed in parts III
and IV. Part III focuses on restrictions on campaign appearances
and advocacy, while part IV focuses on campaign financing.
I E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 96 (1973).
4Id.
This article reviews ethics advisory opinions on file at the American Judicature
Society through 1984.
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Part V concludes that these ethical constraints on judicial elec-
tion campaigns raise serious questions concerning the effective-
ness of an elected judiciary.
I. RuLEs OF ETHICS GOVERNING CANDIDATES FOR JUDICIAL
OFFICE
Each American jurisdiction has, by court rule or legislative
act, adopted separate codes of conduct for judges and for at-
torneys. Successive versions of model ethical provisions for judges
were promulgated by the American Bar Association in 19246 and
1972.7 Presently 47 states, the Federal Judicial Conference, and
the District of Columbia have substantially adopted the 1972
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct," and three states use
codes of ethics based either in whole9 or in part 0 on the prede-
cessor 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. This paper will focus
primarily upon the 1972 Model Code and materials interpreting
its provisions.
Canon 7 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct governs
the campaign and political activities of judges and candidates
.for judicial office." However, there are significant variations in
6 CANONS OF JUDiciAL ETHIcs (1924) [hereinafter CANONS].
CODE OF JuDICALi CONDUCT (1972) [hereinafter CODE]. The American Bar
Association is presently conducting a review of the Code with an eye toward revision.
I Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Del-
aware, District of Columbia, Federal Judicial Conference, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. See Shaman, Two
States Adopt ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 8 JUr. CONDUCT REP. 4, 1 (1987)
for a discussion of recent efforts at Code adoption.
I Montana, Wisconsin.
1o Rhode Island.
t CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7:
A Judge Should Refrain from:
Political Activity Inappropriate:
to His Judicial Office:
A. Political Conduct In General.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(b) make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly
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the substance of Canon 7 among the 47 states that have adopted
endorse a candidate for public office;
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to
a political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or pur-
chase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions, except as
authorized in subsection A(2);
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted
by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on his own
behalf when he is a candidate for election or re-election, identify himself
as a member of a political party, and contribute to a political party or
organization.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either
in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, except
that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a candidate
for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention,
if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the adminis-
tration of justice.
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that
is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on the
basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and
should encourage members of his family to adhere to the same standards
of political conduct that apply to him;
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direc-
tion or control from doing for him what he is prohibited from doing under
this Canon; and except to the extent authorized under subsection B(2) or
B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for him what he is
prohibited from doing under this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that
is filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself
solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he
may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the
expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of
support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from solic-
iting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candi-
date's committees may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than (90)
days before a primary election and no later than (90) days after the last
election in which he participates during the election year. A candidate
should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of himself or members of his family.
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election
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the Code. 12 Most Code states omitted or substantially modified
portions of the Canon. Two states did not adopt Canon 7A,13
which covers political conduct in general, while eleven states
omitted 7B,' 4 which deals specifically with campaign conduct.
Other provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct may also
be relevant to campaign conduct. In one case a judge who
improperly used her office facilities and employees for political
purposes was found to have violated Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 2A. 15 This provision requires a judge to act in a manner
promoting "public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. ' 1 6
Several provisions of the 1924 Model Canons of Judicial
Ethics applied to campaign and political activities of judges and
candidates for judicial office. 17 The constraints imposed by these
to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has drawn
active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may obtain
publicly stated support and campaign funds in the manner provided in
subsection B(2).
CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7.
1 D. FRETz, R. PEEPiES & T. WICKER, Enucs FOR JUDGES 42-47 (1982) [hereinafter
ETcs FOR JUDGES].
" Erncs FOR JUoEs, supra note 12, at 42 (New Mexico and New York).
Id. at 44 (Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia).
In re Conda, 370 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1977).
" CODE, supra note 7, Canon 2A.
17 CANONS, supra note 6, Canons 28, 29, 30, 32 & 34.
28. PARTISAN POLITICS. While entitled to entertain his personal views
of political questions, and while not required to surrender his rights or
opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by
political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of
the interests of one political party as against another. He should avoid
making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or
contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates for
political office and participation in party conventions.
He should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee nor
act as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities.
Where, however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated and elected as
candidates of a political party, nothing herein contained shall prevent the
judge from attending or speaking at political gatherings, or from making
contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has nominated him
and seeks his election or re-election.
Id. at Canon 28.
29. SELF-INTEREST. A judge should abstain from performing or taking
part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved. If he
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VoL. 77
Canons did not differ markedly from those of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 7. The new Canon merely presents the
ethical obligations of judges and candidates in a more specific,
orderly, and succinct fashion.
Candidates for judicial office who are attorneys are also
subject to provisions regulating the ethical conduct of lawyers.
In 1969 the American Bar Association promulgated the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility to replace its 1908 Model
Canons of Professional Ethics as the national standard for rules
has personal litigation in the court of which he is a judge, he need not
resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of course, refrain
from any judicial act in such a controversy.
Id. at Canon 29.
30. CANDIDACY FOR OFFICE. A candidate for judicial position should
not make or suffer others to make for him, promises of conduct in office
which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing
power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on
disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his
office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
While holding a judicial position he should not become an active candidate
either at a party primary or at a general election for any office other than
a judicial office. If a judge should decide to become a candidate for any
office not judicial, he should resign in order that it cannot be said that he
is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his own
candidacy or the success of his party.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he should refrain
from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he
is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his
candidacy or the success of his party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy
which would reasonably lead to such suspicion.
Id. at Canon 30.
32. GIFTS AND FAVORS. A judge should not accept any presents or
favors from litigants, or from lawyers practising before him or from others
whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgement.
Id. at Canon 32.
34. A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL OBLIGATION. In every particular his
conduct should be above reproach. He should be conscientious, studious,
thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public
clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private political or
partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal
with his appointments as a public trust; he should not allow other affairs
or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance
of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for the purpose
of advancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity.
Id. at Canon 34.
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of lawyer ethics." The Model Code was adopted in substantially
the form promulgated in 49 states, usually by order of the state's
supreme court. 19 Illinois drafted and adopted its own code of
legal ethics." The American Bar Association later developed the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and promulgated these
new standards in 1983 as a suggested replacement for the Model
Code,2' which had proven to be inadequate in some respects.
Several provisions of the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility are relevant to lawyers who are candidates for ju-
dicial office, or otherwise participate in the process of election
or appointment of judicial officers. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)
states: "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." This provision would
be violated by a lawyer-candidate or campaign worker who
participates in the use of campaign advertisements or statements
that are untrue or misleading. Additional limitations on cam-
paign advertising are imposed by Disciplinary Rule 2-101,2 which
places restrictions on the form and content of lawyer publicity.
Further, Disciplinary Rule 8-10223 prohibits the use of falsehoods
by lawyers who are promoting candidates for judicial office or
criticizing incumbent judges. The rationale for the DR 8-102
restrictions is provided in Ethical Considerations 8-6 and 8-8.24
,s L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETmcs: THE LAW OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY 6
(1984).
19 Id.
10 Id. Illinois substantially adopted the ABA Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility by Supreme Court Order effective August 1, 1981.
21 Id.
2 "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of
public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-lauda-
tory or unfair statement or claim." MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-101(A) (1969).
23
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning
the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial
office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge
or other adjudicatory officer.
Id. at DR 8-102.
24
Judges and administrative officials having adjudicatory powers ought to
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Finally, Disciplinary Rule 8-103(A) provides that all lawyer-
candidates for judicial office must comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.2
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct include sim-
ilar provisions governing the conduct of lawyers who are can-
didates or are otherwise involved in campaigns for judicial
office. Lawyer-candidates are prohibited by Rules 7.1,26
be persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament. Generally,
lawyers are qualified, by personal observation or investigation, to evaluate
the qualifications of persons seeking or being considered for such public
offices, and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid in the
selection of only those who are qualified. It is the duty of lawyers to
endeavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fit-
ness in the selection of judges. Lawyers should protest earnestly against
the appointment or election of those who are unsuited for the bench and
should strive to have elected or appointed thereto only those who are
willing to forego pursuits, whether of a business, political, or other nature,
that may interfere with the free and fair consideration of questions pre-
sented for adjudication. Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to
defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against
unjust criticism. While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such
officials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use
appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system.
Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal
system are not justified.
Id. at EC 8-6.
Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices.
This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make signifi-
cant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who
is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities
in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be
in conflict with his official duties.
Id. at EC 8-8.
1 "A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable
provisions of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. at DR 8-103(A).
26
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if
it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by
means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
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8.2(a), 27 and 8.4(c)28 from making false or misleading claims
about themselves. Rules 8.2(a) and 8.4(c) also serve to prohibit
lawyer-candidates and lawyers working in campaigns from
making false statements about opposing candidates. Rule 8.2(b)29
requires a lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office to
comply with relevant provisions of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. Rule 8.4(03 o prohibits lawyers working in a judge's
re-election campaign from assisting the candidate in conduct
that violates the applicable rules of judicial conduct or other
law.
In addition to the ethical provisions governing the conduct
of judges and lawyers, candidates for judicial office may also
be subject to state statutes concerning election practices, finan-
cial disclosure, and other campaign-related matters.3 1 Interpre-
tation of the campaign ethics provisions of the judicial and
attorney standards of conduct is available through a limited body
of case law and through a much larger number of ethics advisory
opinions issued by agencies in twenty-one states32 and the Amer-
ican Bar Association. Also, ethical guidelines for judicial cam-
paigns have been adopted by bar associations in a number of
states33 and by the supreme court in at least one state.34
27
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications
or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of
a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
Id. at Rule 8.2(a).
11 "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (c) engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id. at Rule 8.4(A).
"A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. at Rule 8.2(b).
" "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (f) knowingly assist a judge
or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct
or other law." Id. at Rule 8.4.
11 See, eg., Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. 21 1A.01
(West 1988).
2 Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts.
33 See, e.g., New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics,
Op. 289 (1973).
11 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. ch. 12-9 app. (1982).
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II. JURISDICTION OVER ETHICAL VIOLATIONS By PARTICIPANTS
IN CAMPAIGNS FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have created
agencies authorized to investigate allegations of ethical impro-
prieties by judges, and where necessary, either to impose or to
recommend the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. 35 These
agencies typically have jurisdiction over all state judicial offi-
cers. 36 Each jurisdiction specifies grounds for the discipline of
judges. Generally, judges may be disciplined for wilful miscon-
duct, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice, or for violation of provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct or separate state standards of ethics.37 Some states do
not specifically refer to violations of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct as a ground for discipline, but instead use the provisions
of the Code to determine if "wilful misconduct" or "conduct
prejudicial" have occurred. 38
Incumbent judges campaigning for re-election who commit
ethical violations are subject to discipline by a judicial discipline
agency in all jurisdictions. Most judicial discipline agencies have
jurisdiction over acts by judges occurring prior to the time the
judge takes office.39 Thus, these agencies are able to address
3' See I. TESITOR & D. SnIxs, JUDICLa CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1980).
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONSr. art. VI.I, §§ 4, 5.
On recommendation of the commission on judicial qualifications, the
Supreme Court may retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes
with the performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent,
and may censure or remove a judge for action by him that constitutes
wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his
duties, habitual intemperance or conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
Id. at § 4.
The term "judge" as used in this constitutional amendment shall apply to
all justices of the peace, judges of the superior court, judges of the Court
of Appeals and justices of the Supreme Court.
Id. at § 5.
37 I. TasrroR & D. Sinxs, supra note 35, at 40.
38 See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. VI.I § 4; Ga. Const. art. VI, § XIII, III(b); Ind.
Const. art. 7, § 11; S.D. Const. art. V, § 9.
31 See, e.g., In re Samford, 352 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1977) (Judge could be removed
from office for conduct including stealing funds from a client's trust account while he
was an attorney); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (Lawyer's misconduct
that occurred before his appointment to judicial office may be the basis for judicial
disciplinary action).
[VOL. 77
ETmcAL CONSTRAINTS
ethical violations occurring during a campaign after a successful
candidate takes office. However, judicial discipline agencies gen-
erally do not have jurisdiction over non-judge candidates during
the course of a campaign. 40
Each jurisdiction has also created an agency to investigate
allegations of misconduct by attorneys and, in appropriate in-
stances, to initiate proceedings that may result in discipline. 41
Violating the state version of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, or, in states which have adopted them, the new
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are grounds for disci-
pline. 42 Thus, attorney discipline agencies can address ethical
violations by attorneys assisting in campaigns for judicial office
and by attorneys who are currently candidates or who have been
unsuccessful candidates for judicial office. 43
Some states permit non-attorneys to serve as judicial officers
in courts of limited jurisdiction.44 Ethical violations committed
by a non-attorney in the course of a campaign for judicial office
can be punished by the judicial discipline agency if the candidate
is successful. Otherwise, neither the judicial discipline agency,
nor the attorney discipline agency will gain jurisdiction over a
non-attorney candidate, and ethical violations by such candidates
will remain unaddressed. Of course, all candidates for judicial
office, including non-attorneys, are subject to civil or criminal
process for violation of state election laws.
40 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., Op. 80-83 (1980) ("A candidate for judicial office,
who is not a judge, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Inquiry Commission
but is subject to the original jurisdiction of the Alabama Supreme Court.").
41 See AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES
N CuNTS' SECURrrY F NDs (1985) (agencies listed for all jurisdictions).
12 AMERIcAN BAR AssocATION, SuRvEY OF LAWYER DIscIPLINARY PROCEDURES IN
THE UNITED STATES 9 (1984).
41 N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973)
("The canons, the guidelines and all other rules applicable to judicial campaigns apply
not only to judges but also to others seeking judicial office, and persons acting on their
behalf, and apply to campaigns for primary as well as general elections."); see also
MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILITY DR 8-103(A) (1969); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (1983).
- For a census of lay judges in these courts and a survey of statutes as of 1979,
see L.J. SnEamAN, NoN-ATTORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL
STUmY 253-60, 285-317 (1979) (available in Florida State University Law Library).
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III. CAMPAIGN APPEARANCES AND ADVOCACY
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") places a
number of restrictions on the activities of candidates for judicial
office.
A. Code Restrictions on Campaign Appearances
Restrictions on the time and place of campaign appearances
are imposed by the portions of Canon 7 of the Code dealing
with judges' political conduct in general, and dealing specifically
with conduct of candidates for office. Canon 7A(l) provides
that a candidate for judicial office may never:
1. Serve as a leader or in any office in a political organi-
zation.
2. Make speeches on behalf of a political organization,
party, or a particular candidate other than himself or herself.
3. Endorse another candidate for any office.
4. Solicit funds for a political organization or another
candidate, or contribute funds to another candidate. 45
Under Canon 7A(2), however, a candidate for a judicial office
filled by public election between competing candidates may, to
the extent permitted by state law:
1. Attend political gatherings.
2. Contribute to a political organization and purchase
tickets to political party dinners.
3. Identify himself or herself as a member of a political
party.
4. Speak to political gatherings on his or her own behalf."
An incumbent judge occupying such an office is also permitted
to engage in these activities throughout his or her tenure in
office, except that he or she may only speak to political gath-
erings while a candidate for re-election. 47
41 For the exact text of Canon 7, see supra note 11.
" For the exact text of Canon 7, see id.
47 See CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7A(2).
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B. Timing and Types of Campaign Appearances
To date, all ethics advisory opinions dealing with the earliest
permissible date for beginning a campaign for judicial office
have been addressed to campaign activity by incumbents. In
Kentucky, the state Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge
is a candidate for re-election during his or her entire term of
office.s Therefore, a Kentucky advisory opinion holds that a
judge may campaign for re-election at any time, as long as the
time limits on solicitation of campaign funds are observed. 49
Some states establish by law time limits for campaigning.
For example, in New York an "announced" judicial candidate
may attend politically sponsored affairs within nine months of
a primary or a nominating convention. 0 To qualify for partici-
pation in such affairs, an aspirant for office must have publicly
announced his or her candidacy by some affirmative action such
as a letter to an appropriate political officer or a letter to the
media. s'
It may sometimes be difficult to determine whether an in-
cumbent who is not yet a candidate for re-election is improperly
speaking to political gatherings on his or her own behalf or if
such a person is merely speaking to such gatherings on legal
matters as permitted by Canon 4 of the Code. A Florida advisory
opinion states that it is permissible for an incumbent judge,
prior to the time of qualifying for re-election, to attend a par-
tisan political club meeting to give a speech about the role of a
county court judge in the judicial system, to attend a partisan
political club meeting solely to be introduced as a guest who is
a county court judge, or to attend a non-partisan meeting of a
civil, social, or homeowners group to give a speech about the
role of a county court judge.52
•S Ky. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7A(2) [Ky. Supreme Court Rule 4.300].
' Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-42(3)
(1983), Op. JE-45(5) (1983).
" Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, Rules Governing Judicial
Conduct § 100.7(a)(1).
S, N.Y. Office of Court Administration, Judicial Ethics Op. 76 (1977), Judicial
Ethics Op. 134 (1978), Judicial Ethics Op. 149 (1978).
12 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
77-21 (1978).
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Once the timing issue is resolved and a campaign is clearly
under way, candidates for a judicial office filled by a public
election between competitors may appear before virtually any
group, as long as the appearance does not denigrate the dignity
of the office sought or imply that the candidate, if successful,
would act in a biased or partial manner. Thus, such a candidate
may, along with other candidates, attend a "political fair" spon-
sored by various civic groups to permit voters to become ac-
quainted with candidates. 53 A candidate may also speak as the
sole guest speaker at a club affiliated with a political party.54
However, it would probably be inappropriate for such a candi-
date to appear before a group that espouses views of an invidi-
ously discriminatory nature, because an appearance before such
a group could be construed as indicating future bias.55
The Code is silent on whether candidates competing for the
same judicial office may make joint appearances. However, one
ethics advisory opinion states that a candidate may not engage
in a public debate with another candidate or other candidates
for the same office, because this would almost certainly put the
candidate in the position of having to make pledges of future
conduct in office.5 6
C. Merit Selection Jurisdictions-Special Considerations
Somewhat different strictures apply to candidates for reten-
tion under a merit system of selection as well as unopposed
candidates for re-election. Under Canon 7B(3), such candidates
may only begin to campaign once active opposition has formed.
An Arizona ethics advisory opinion tempers this rule by holding
that a candidate for retention or re-election may begin to cam-
paign as soon as he or she reasonably believes that he or she
1, Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
74-11 (1974), Op. 77-21 (1978).
- Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-6 (1978).
51 See CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(1)(c); see also CODE, supra note 7, Canon 2
(recently amended comments concern membership by judges in organizations that prac-
tice discrimination in selecting members).
- Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-13 (1978).
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has or will have substantial opposition, regardless of how early
that may occur.57
Because Canon 7A has been interpreted as applying to can-
didates seeking retention in office under a merit plan,58 Canons
7A(l)(c) and (2) appear to preclude most types of campaign
appearances by these candidates. However, Canon 7B(3) permits
such a candidate who encounters active opposition to campaign
"in response thereto." Although a sensible reconciliation of
these subsections would permit such a candidate to speak before
gatherings of voters on his or her own behalf, regardless of the
nature of the gathering, the extent to which such campaign
activity would be permitted remains unclear.
D. Appearances on Behalf of Other Candidates
To avoid enabling judges to lend the prestige of their offices
"to advance the private interests of others," 5 9 Canon 7A(l)(b)
forbids judges or candidates for judicial office to endorse any
candidate for public office. Thus, candidates for judicial office
must be cautious in appearing with, or participating in joint
campaign appearances with, other candidates, so as not to give
the impression that such action constitutes an endorsement of
the other candidates. Although a non-incumbent candidate has
never been found in violation of ethical standards regulating
endorsements, at least four sitting judges have been disciplined
for participating in and supporting other persons' campaigns for
judicial office. One judge was disbarred and effectively removed
from office for numerous ethical violations, including arranging
and attending political gatherings and serving as a toastmaster
at a testimonial for another candidate 0 Another judge was
publicly reprimanded for improper conduct including sending
100 postcards and letters in support of a judicial candidate.6 1
Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 78-1 (1978).
11 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1513
(April 27, 1985).
S9 CODE, supra note 7, Canon 2B. "[A judge] should not lend the prestige of his
office to advance the private interests of others." Id.
61 In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973).
61 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Capers, 15 Ohio St. 3d 122, 472 N.E.2d 1073
(1984).
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Two other judges were disciplined for contributing money,62 or
money and public support6 3 to candidates for judicial office.
Campaign literature endorsing several candidates for judicial
office issued by someone other than the candidates has been
approved by an ethics advisory body in New York.6 A Louisiana
ethics opinion holds that a group of judges facing opposition
for re-election may publish a sample ballot suggesting that all
be re-elected, but may not include unopposed candidates on the
sample ballot 6 5 Commentary to the Code states that a candidate
may run on the same ticket as other candidates without running
afoul of limitations on endorsements 66
E. Code Restrictions on Campaign Advocacy
Canons 7B(l)(a) and (c) of the Code caution that a candidate
for a judicial office:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial
office, and should encourage members of his family to adhere
to the same standards of political conduct that apply to him;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications,
present position, or other fact.
Thus, a campaign is undignified if a candidate runs on a
platform advocating preferences for specific persons or groups,
commits himself or herself in advance on disputed legal issues,
or announces views on disputed political issues.67 These restric-
tions have been upheld when challenged on first and fourteenth
amendment grounds, as serving important state interests.68 It has
62 In re Carter, 47 Ky. BENCH & BAR 16 (Ky. Comm'n July 1983).
4 In re Smith, 449 So. 2d 755 (Miss. 1984).
6, N.Y. Office of Court Administration, Judicial Ethics Op. 34 (1975).
61 La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 57 (1982).
" CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7A(l)(b) comment. "A candidate does not publicly
endorse another candidate for public office by having his name on the same ticket." Id.
" See, e.g., Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing
Judges, Op. 78-15 (1978).
Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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been said, however, that given the limitations on campaign speech
by judicial candidates, "the man in the moon and the weather-
man are about all of the people a judicial candidate can with
impunity talk about without attitudinizing himself. ' 69
F. Statements Relating to Conduct in Office
Judges have been found guilty of ethical improprieties for
campaign Statements indicating what their conduct in office would
be, even where the promised conduct involved general statements
concerning the administration of the law. An incumbent Wash-
ington judge was censured for campaign statements that he was
"tough on drunk driving," '70 and a Kentucky judge was censured
for distributing campaign materials containing the phrases, "solid
reputation for law and order" and "does not allow plea baf-
gaining." 7' Another Kentucky judge was suspended from office
for ten days without pay for suggesting in a campaign adver-
tisement thit he would rule favorably toward a particular group
if elected.72
Ethics advisory opinions have addressed the propriety of
numerous statements and pledges candidates have proposed to
use in the course of a campaign. The general sense of these
opinions is that anything that could be interpreted as a pledge
of a particular approach a candidate will take in deciding cases
is prohibited. It is inappropriate for a candidate to state that he
or she could personally throw the switch on anyone convicted
of a capital crime.7 3 A candidate may not express the view that
marijuana should be decriminalized. 74 A candidate cannot use
the slogan "a strict sentencing philosophy," as it gives the
impression that he or she would act in a biased manner in certain
cases.75 At least one state takes the view that statements by a
69 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-13 (1978).
70 In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 394-401 (Wash. 1988).
7' In re Nolan, Unreported Order (Ky. Comm'n 1984).
72 In re Ehlschide, Unreported Order (Ky. Comm'n 1982).
" Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-6 (1978).
7 Id.
7S State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. C-
219 (1980); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1444
(1980).
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candidate concerning the use of plea bargaining should be avoided
because they may be seen as a pledge of future conduct, and
plea bargaining is a controversial (disputed) issue. 6 In Kentucky,
a candidate cannot even take the position that a particular rule
of court should be changed. This, too, constitutes a pledge of
conduct in office. 77
A candidate may also be limited in the extent of his or her
activities outside of the campaign if those activities may indicate
future conduct in office. A candidate for an Ohio judicial office
was advised that he could not remain involved in a political
dispute involving a referendum on an income tax law during the
course of his candidacy.7
A frequent practice by those interested in campaigns for
public office, such as the media or special interest groups, is the
circulation of questionnaires on specific issues to all candidates.
The results may later be used in news stories, or for formulating
an endorsement. Most advisory opinions addressing the use of
questionnaires in judicial campaigns strongly disapprove of the
practice. Thus, judicial candidates have been advised to refuse
to respond to questionnaires from political organizations con-
cerning gun control, abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment,
regulation of condominiums and the right to work.7 9 A county
bar association was cautioned not to survey the views of candi-
dates for judicial office as to whether they agreed or disagreed
with specific decisions of an appellate court.10 The ethics com-
mittee reasoned that such a questionnaire would ask candidates
to dispose of complex issues in an overly simplistic manner and
may give the impression that he or she would not be supportive
of controlling authority. That is, expression of an intent to
disregard precedent would be unethical.81 However, the same bar
,6 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-38
(1982).
" Id.
11 Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal and Professional Conduct, Infor-
mal Op. 82-3 (1982).
71 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
80-13 (1980).
, State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. C-
222 (1982), Informal Op. CI-696 (1982).
81 Id.
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ethics committee later ruled that a bar association would be
permitted to circulate a questionnaire designed to elicit candi-
dates' criticisms of prior court decisions in a fair and reasonable
manner. This meant that the questionnaire could not create even
the impression that a candidate would later act with bias or
partiality.82
The State of Oregon takes the view that the candidate must
determine whether the questions asked in a survey are political
and controversial.83 The version of Canon 7B(l)(c) in use in
Oregon forbids comments on political issues, but permits com-
ments on legal issues. 84 In attempting to differentiate between
the two, this state has indicated that the death penalty, pre-trial
release of criminal defendants, the purposes to be accomplished
by sentencing and the selection method used to choose judges
are all legal issues. 85
Generally, candidates for judicial office may neither initiate
discussion of specific recent cases nor respond to questions con-
cerning such cases. An Alabama judge seeking re-election was
instructed that it would be improper for him to comment on
specific cases he had been involved in, though he could comment
on and explain relevant court procedures and the law governing
a judge's duty in particular situations.8 6 Comment by an incum-
bent (including a candidate for retention) about matters pending
in court at the time of the campaign is prohibited by Canon
3A(6) of the Code.87 An advisory opinion committee in Florida
takes the unique position that, while Canon 3A(6) prohibits
incumbent candidates from commenting on a disputed legal issue
82 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-921 (1983).
Or. Judicial Conference, Judicial Conduct Comm., Ethics Op. 80-1 (1980).
, See Or. Judicial Conference, Judicial Conduct Comm., Ethics Op. 78-5 (1980).
Id.
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-85 (1980).
97 CODE, supra note 7, Canon 3A(6).
A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending
proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part
of court personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection
does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of
their official duties or from explaining for public information the proce-
dures of the court.
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that is presently before them, Canon 4 (allowing judges to speak
concerning the law and legal system) permits them to comment
on disputed legal issues not presently before their court.,, Several
advisory opinions hold that a candidate may not comment about
specific concluded cases to explain the basis of rulings or sen-
tences, or to justify the result reached, 89 although a candidate
may probably explain that the law dictates some results. 9°
Given the limitations on what a candidate for judicial office
may say about disputed issues, and about particular cases, what
may a candidate say about his or her past conduct or intentions
while in office? Advisory committees have been careful to point
out that restrictions on campaign speech are not intended to
limit the judicial candidate solely to promises of faithful per-
formance of the duties of the judicial office. 91 However, inter-
pretations of Canon 7B(l) of the Code do appear to limit the
candidate to discussion of judicial system improvements and
reforms the candidate wishes to implement, and truthful criticism
of the qualifications of an opponent. In Berge v. Supreme Court
of Ohio,92 the court found that Canon 7B(l)(c) passes constitu-
tional muster in that it does not prohibit a judicial candidate
from proposing to implement a pre-trial mediation program, or
from criticizing the incumbent's frequent use of trial referees.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Baker,9 considered the
propriety of a variety of campaign statements. The court found
that Canon 7B(l)(c) permits a candidate to pledge to increase
the efficiency of the court, to work hard and to be prompt, to
reduce the need for outside judges to sit in the county, to note
the incumbent's ill health and the delays it had caused and to
refer to his own robust health, and to characterize his campaign
pledges as "reforms." The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a
" Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-7 (1978).
s1 See Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-85 (1980); Ala. Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-86 (1980), Advisory Op. 82-156 (1982); New York
State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
90 See, e.g., Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 82-156 (1982).
9' See, e.g., Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 82-153 (1982).
No. C-2-84-1227, slip op. (S.D. Ohio 1984).
93 542 P.2d 701 (Kan. 1975).
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decision of a similar tenor, held in Bundlie v. Christensen94 that
a candidate could criticize the incumbent by pointing out that
the county's court expenses were higher than in surrounding
counties. In Florida, a candidate may say "I will make every
effort to see that there is effective discipline of children who
become subject to the juvenile powers of the court, ' 95 and in
Kentucky candidates may indicate they favor the use of com-
puters to increase the efficiency of the court or propose other
methods of improving court procedures. 96
Questions about an incumbent's record raised in the course
of a re-election campaign may be addressed by explanation of
legal requirements and procedures. A candidate may, for ex-
ample, explain that sentences imposed in many criminal cases
are based on prosecution recommendations.9 7 He or she may
also comment on the uses of probation, and the duty of a judge
to set reasonable bail and to appoint counsel for indigents. 98 An
incumbent is not expected to remain silent in the face of criti-
cism, and may refer to his or her own record, court statistics,
and other facts. 99
The qualifications of a candidate are, of course, a legitimate
topic for discussion in the course of a campaign. Candidates
may explain their credentials and experience, and indicate areas
of expertise and certified specialties, so long as this is not done
in a misleading manner.'00
Advisory opinions reflect the view taken in the Baker, Berge,
and Bundlie cases concerning the legitimacy of candidates'
directing fair criticism at opponents. For example, a candidate
in Florida was permitted to comment on the incumbent's re-
quirement of physical arrest of all persons charged in minor
94 276 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1979).
"1 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-7 (1978).
96 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-38(2)
(1982), Op. JE-45 (1983).
91 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 82-156 (1982).
" Id.; see also Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-85 (1980).
9' Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-86 (1980).
10 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-10 (1984); Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-
45 (1983); N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
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offenses, and of threatening defendants with a jail term if they
did not plea bargain. 101 The challenger was permitted to openly
disagree with these practices, and to state that he would look
closely at each misdemeanor case before issuing a capias, would
generally be in favor of using the summons power rather than
physical arrest, and would not threaten defendants for exercising
their rights. 102 The ethics advisory committee in Kentucky has
indicated that, as in Baker, a challenging candidate may criticize
the incumbent's frequent absences from court,'0 3 although, as
noted earlier, judicial candidates are generally prohibited from
responding to questionnaires seeking their views on controversial
topics. At least one ethics committee has indicated that a can-
didate for an appellate court may appropriately criticize an
earlier opinion of the court and the legal philosophy underlying
that opinion. 1 4 Another jurisdiction has permitted a candidate
to challenge the current representational balance of the court on
which he wished to sit.' 5
Although judicial candidates have some leeway in criticizing
their opponents or their opponents' supporters, their criticism
may not be of a nature that brings their own impartiality or
that of the judiciary into question. In In re Kaiser,'°6 the Su-
preme Court of Washington censured an incumbent who stated
that he was tough on drunk driving and who questioned the
motives of DWI defense attorneys in supporting the judge's
opponent: "their primary interests are getting their clients off."' 7
The court found that the drunk driving statements, "promise
exactly the opposite of 'impartial performance of the duties of
the office." ' ' 0 8 However, the court declined to sanction the judge
for criticizing his opponent for receiving most of his financial
"I Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-18 (1984).
102 Id.
101 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-45
(1983).
1o4 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. C-
227 (1982).
101 Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct,
Informal Op. 84-4 (1984).
I' 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
107 Id. at 396-401.
101 Id. at 396.
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support from drunk driving defense attorneys.'09 The supreme
court ruled that statements concerning an opponent's sources of
support are constitutionally protected speech unless the state-
ments are false and made with knowledge of their falsity.110
G. Accuracy of Campaign Statements
The case law and advisory opinions hold candidates for
judicial office to a high standard of accuracy in their campaign
statements. In the Baker case, the respondent judge was censured
for issuing a mailing which falsely stated that the incumbent
would receive substantial retirement benefits if defeated, thereby
implying he would not be harmed by a defeat. The court ruled
that this conduct constituted a violation of Canon 7B(1)(c)."' A
Washington state attorney was reprimanded in In re Donohue,12
for violations of DR's 1-102 and 8-102, as well as Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1), when she engaged in a pattern
of making false statements about incumbents on the court to
whose offices she aspired, and altered and then reproduced a
letter from another attorney and used it as part of her campaign
materials. A candidate for a Kentucky judicial post was repri-
manded for distributing campaign materials falsely representing
that he was the incumbent by using the phrase "John Doe,
District Judge."'' Similarly, a Florida domestic relations com-
missioner seeking a position as a judge was cautioned, in an
advisory opinion, that he could not indicate in campaign litera-
ture that he was a judicial officer, although he could cite his
"judicial experience. "1 4 A Michigan candidate for judicial office
was instructed that he could not use the slogan "A Judge for a
-M "My opponent... has received the majority of his financial contributions from
drunk driving defense attorneys. This is the only group involved with Northeast District
Court not supporting my re-election." Id. at 395.
110 Id. at 397-99. The court stated that "even though Judge Kaiser's statements
violate the strict terms of Canon 7(B)(1)(d), they are constitutionally protected and there
is no violation." Id. at 399.
"I In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701, 706 (Kan. 1975).
112 580 P.2d 1093, 1097-99 (Wash. 1978).
"' Order of Private Reprimand, 7 Accent on Courts, No. 1, at 23 (Ky. Comm'n
1985).
"' Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-17 (1984).
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Change" because it falsely suggested that he was an incumbent
judge. 115
The current law does not resolve the question of whether a
candidate for judicial office must fairly represent both sides of
an issue relevant to the campaign. In Bundlie v. Christensen,"6
a candidate was not found to have violated Canon 7B when he
criticized the high level of county court expenses without ex-
plaining that there were good reasons that the costs were higher
than in surrounding counties. However, a judge in Washington
state was publicly admonished for a violation of Canon 7B(l)(c)
after issuing a campaign pamphlet, deceptively similar to the
official voter's pamphlet, that failed to reveal that he had op-
position and that the position sought was contested.' 7
Another area where case law concerning the accuracy of
campaign materials is inconsistent is the use of campaign polls.
A Kentucky judge was suspended without salary for ten days
for a violation of Canon 7B(l)(c) after publishing campaign
advertising that indicated a professional poll placed him ahead
of his opponent when in fact no such poll had been conducted.""
But in In re Elward,"9 the Illinois Courts Commission found
that no punishable impropriety had occurred where an incum-
bent judge excerpted for use in a campaign advertisement a
favorable portion of a bar association evaluation that was gen-
erally unfavorable to the judge. The Commission found that the
total mix of information available to the voters was sufficiently
accurate so that no discipline was warranted.
H. Campaign Advertisements and Endorsements
Generally, advisory opinions merely specify that advertise-
ments for a judicial candidate must contain statements that are
true, must maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office,
and may not make false statements designed to promote the
" State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-556 (1980).
116 276 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1979).
17 In re McGlothen, Unreported Letter of Admonishment (Wash. Judicial Qual.
Comm'n 1983).
338 In re Jack D. Wood, Unreported Order (Ky. Comm'n 1982).
119 1 111. Cts. Comm. 114 (Ill. 1977).
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election or defeat of a candidate. 120 Few opinions limit the forms
of media that may be used. Thus, most media, including radio,
television, newspapers and other publications, posters and hand-
bills may be used to convey campaign material.12'
Some restrictions exist on direct mail contact with voters.
Ethics advisory opinions have approved the use, by a lawyer, of
his or her law office stationery to advertise the candidacy of the
aspirant to office.'2 However, other opinions hold that it is
improper for a judge to use his or her court stationery for the
same purpose. 2 1 Judges who wish to send letters of appreciation
to those having completed jury service have been cautioned to
take care that the timing or content of the letters does not imply
an attempt to use the letters to promote a re-election bid.124
These opinions concerning the use of court stationery are based
on the long-standing principle that a judge may not exploit the
power and prestige of the office to promote his or her candidacy.
All campaign advertisements are subject to the Canon 7B(1)(a)
requirement that a campaign be conducted with dignity. This
may be of particular importance to those using the broadcast
media. One advisory opinion states that it would be inappropri-
ate for an attorney-candidate to give answers over the radio to
specific legal questions sent in by listeners. 25
All jurisdictions that have addressed the question agree that
an incumbent judge may be pictured in his or her robe in
'2 Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal and Professional Conduct, Infor-
mal Op. 84-4 (1984).
12 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-10 (1984) (television commercial implicitly approved); Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm.,
Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-38(3) (1982) (candidate may advertise on
television and radio); State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Informal Op. CI-545 (1980) (campaign committee may place advertisements in newspa-
pers, on television and radio); N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 289 (1973) (may use any media).
"I N.Y. Office of Court Administration, Judicial Ethics Op. 40 (1975) (Part-time
lawyer/judge may use law office stationery to advertise campaign); Pa. Bar Association
Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 81-27 (1981) (Attorney may seek contributions to
campaign on law office stationery).
"I N.Y. Office of Court Administration, Judicial Ethics Op. 129 (1978).
'11 Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Judicial Section, State Bar of Tex., Op. 68 (1983),
Op. 69 (1983).
12 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93 (1933).
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campaign materials, so long as the picture is not misleading. 126
A candidate who was not presently a judge, but had previously
served on the bench, was allowed by the Florida ethics advisory
committee to use a picture taken during his previous tenure in
campaign materials that clearly explained the source of the pic-
ture and the dates when he previously served. 127 Other jurisdic-
tions, however, disagree with this position. A Michigan committee
would not permit a former temporary magistrate to use photo-
graphs of himself in judicial robes. The advisory committee
reasoned that such a picture would misrepresent the candidate
as an incumbent. 12 Washington takes the same stance. A can-
didate there was admonished for publishing a picture of himself
in judicial robes when he had merely served as a judge pro
tem. 129 Even though text accompanying the photograph explained
the candidate's judicial service, the Commission believed that
the impression created misrepresented the candidate's position. 30
A few jurisdictions have ruled on the propriety of photo-
graphs of a candidate in a courtroom. However, in Saefke v.
VandeWalle,13' the court found no impropriety in an incumbent
justice's use of campaign materials showing him in his robe in
a courtroom. A New York ethics advisory committee takes a
narrower view. Although the New York committee approves
photographs showing an incumbent in judicial robes, it specifies
that the photograph may not show the candidate in court.132 The
rationale for this position is that a picture of an incumbent in
court takes unfair advantage of the power and prestige of the
candidate's office.
'16 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
80-10 (1980); La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 7 (1972); Md. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Op. 18 (1973); N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 289 (1973), Op. 558 (1984); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1450 (1980).
I" Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
80-10 (1980).
12, State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-1007 (1984).
,21 In re McGlothen, Unreported Letter of Admonishment (Wash. Judicial Qual.
Comm'n 1983)..
13 Id.
,3. 279 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1978).
32 N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 558 (1984).
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The Code establishes identical standards for the procurement
of endorsements and the procurement of campaign funds. Canon
7B(2) forbids a candidate from personally soliciting publicly
stated support and requires him or her to establish a campaign
committee to perform that task. 3 3 The predecessor Canons of
Judicial Ethics did not contain a specific prohibition of personal
solicitation of endorsements, but were interpreted to prohibit
such personal solicitation in several advisory opinions. 34 Ken-
tucky has adopted a modified version of Canon 7B(2). It permits
a candidate to personally solicit public statements of support
from lawyers and others. The state supreme court has informally
interpreted this provision to prohibit such solicitation of lawyers
in or about the courthouse. 3 -
Theoretically, similar concerns over the solicitation of en-
dorsements should exist in jurisdictions using an appointive sys-
tem. An advisory opinion issued in Maryland, a jurisdiction
which then used a code of judicial ethics based on the 1924
Canons of Judicial Ethics, strikes an interesting compromise
between a flat prohibition of personal solicitation of endorse-
ments and the more liberal Kentucky rule. In Maryland, one
wishing to be appointed to a judicial office may inform members
of the bar of this interest, and advise them that any support
they would care to communicate to the appointing authority
would be appreciated. Attorneys contacted should not be asked
to tell the candidate if they will do as asked, nor to tell the
candidate of any action subsequently taken. 36
A few restrictions apply concerning the source of endorse-
ments. Canon 7A(l)(b) prohibits a judge from endorsing a can-
133
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is
filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself
solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he
may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the
expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of
support for his candidacy.
CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2).
"I ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 105 (1934),
Formal Op. 139 (1935), Informal Op. 817 (1965).
"I Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-45
(1983).
136 Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 79 (1980).
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didate for any public office. Thus, it is improper for a judge to
endorse a judicial candidate or for a judicial candidate to accept
such an endorsement if it is offered. 13 7 An exception may be
made in jurisdictions using merit selection. One advisory opinion
holds that a judge may properly submit names of potential
candidates to a merit selection panel, and submit evaluations to
the panel in response to a request. 3 '
Another questionable source of endorsements are special in-
terest groups. Acceptance of the endorsement or nomination of
a group such as Right to Life may be construed as a pledge of
conduct in office, and therefore place a candidate in violation
of Canon 7B(l)(c). The only law on this point is an advisory
opinion issued by the New York State Bar Association.' That
opinion states that a judicial candidate may accept the endorse-
ment or nomination of the Right to Life Party provided he or
she refrains from expressing a view on abortion and that the
endorsement or nomination is not conditioned on the candidate's
view on that topic. 140
Statements of public support may be freely sought from
lawyers. Because lawyers have a special opportunity to observe
and assess the qualifications of judicial candidates, they are
encouraged to come forward with their views. 141 An incumbent
in a contested election is free to use in the campaign unsolicited
complimentary commentary from lawyers, as long as a campaign
committee secures permission from the statement's authors. 42 A
candidate may announce that he or she has the support of X
number of local bar former presidents, or of X number of local
lawyers, if such statements are accurate. 143 A ,candidate may
'37 See N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973);
Or. Judicial Conference, Judicial Conduct Comm., Ethics Op. 82-3 (1982); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 719 (1964).
138 United States Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Op.
59 (1979).
-3 N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Judicial Election Monitoring, Op. 1
(1983).
140 Id.
1, Ky. Bar Association Ethics Comm., Op. E-277 (1984); State Bar of Mich.
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-565 (1981).
142 Ethics Advisory Comm., State of Wash., Op. 85-2 (1985).
1, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 817
(1965).
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advertise the fact that he or she has been endorsed by labor
unions and fraternal or other civil groups. 144 An attorney or
group of attorneys practicing together may publicly endorse a
candidate for judicial office by distributing letters printed on
professional letterhead.' 45
A question may arise concerning whether the relationship
between an endorser and an incumbent candidate or successful
aspirant to office should lead to-the disqualification of the judge
when the endorser appears in court. All ethics advisory panels
which have addressed this question agree that per se disqualifi-
cation is unnecessary.' 46 Some opinions, however, caution that a
judge should look at each case where an endorser appears to
determine if factors beyond the mere public support of the
judge's candidacy militate in favor of disqualification.147
I. Disqualification Implications
Should the successful candidate disqualify himself or herself
in cases where a losing opposing candidate appears in court?
Should an incumbent judge who will seek re-election disqualify
himself or herself when an announced opponent appears in
court? The Florida ethics advisory committee takes the view that
an incumbent is required, by Canon 3C, to disqualify himself
or herself in all cases where an announced opponent appears.148
The same committee also believes that a successful candidate
should disqualify himself or herself in all cases where the de-
feated opponent appears; such disqualification is necessary until
the judge believes that his or her impartiality can no longer
reasonably be questioned-perhaps for as long as two years. 149
I" Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-38
(1982).
,,1 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-565 (1981).
"4 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-213 (1984); Fla. Supreme Court
Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-7 (1978); I11. State Bar
Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 866 (1984).
"I Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-213 (1984).
'"4 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-12 (1984).
Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
84-23 (1984).
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The ethics advisory committee in Alabama disagrees with the
Florida opinion. It would only require a judge to disqualify
himself or herself if facts and circumstances exist, arising out of
the campaign, which cause the judge to harbor a personal bias
or prejudice against the defeated opponent, or if other facts
would cause the judge's impartiality to be reasonably ques-
tioned. 150
IV. FINANCING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The financing of a campaign for judicial office is governed
by Canons 7B(2) and 7B(3) of the Code. Through these provi-
sions, the Code attempts to insulate candidates from personal
contact with contributors that may lead to allegations of bias
when a contributor appears before the judge.'5 ' Thus, candidates
are prohibited from personally soliciting or accepting campaign
funds, and commentary to the Code urges that, where possible,
candidates should not be told the identity of contributors.5 2
Instead, the Code calls for candidates to establish committees
of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of
funds, and to file any necessary disclosure statements.5 3
A. Campaign Committee Requirements
Because the membership of a candidate's campaign commit-
tee is not explicitly delineated by a Code provision, the compo-
sition of campaign committees has been the subject of a number
of inquiries resulting in ethics opinions. A South Carolina ad-
visory opinion states that the language of Canon 7B(2) indicating
" Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-219 (1984).
'st E. THODE, supra note 3, at 99.
In order to insulate the candidate to some extent and thereby reduce the
danger of the appearance of a lack of impartiality toward those persons
who financially support him, or refuse to support him, the Committee
required that soliciting and accepting of funds be performed on the can-
didate's behalf by a committee or committees.
Id.
152 See CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2). "Unless a candidate is required by law
to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the
candidate." Id. Canon 7B(2) comment.
... CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2).
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that campaign committees "are not prohibited from soliciting
campaign contributions... from lawyers," does not imply that
lawyers cannot serve on such a committee. 5 4 It is generally
accepted that lawyers may serve on a committee working for the
election of a candidate for judicial office. 155 A candidate may
name his brother as his campaign chairman.lss A candidate may
appoint a public official to his or her campaign finance com-
mittee so long as that person is not in some manner subject to
the direction and control of the candidate by virtue of the
candidate's position as an incumbent judge or other supervisory
official. 57
A candidate is not, according to one advisory opinion, eth-
ically permitted to appoint as campaign chairperson a person
who is running for a government attorney position, even if that
person is unopposed.'5 8 Also, an incumbent candidate may not
appoint his or her trial commissioner as campaign treasurer-or
presumably to any post on the campaign committee. A trial
commissioner is generally considered a judicial officer, and the
commissioner's appointment to the committee would constitute
an improper public endorsement of the candidate by the com-
missioner in violation of the commissioner's obligation under
Canon 7A(l)(b) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.5 9 Finally, a
candidate may not appoint himself or herself to the committee,
and thereby avoid the strictures of provisions limiting personal
solicitation by candidates. 6°
15 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
(1982).
W' Committee on Professional Ethics, Bar Association of Nassau County, N.Y.,
Op. 80-9 (1980).
136 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-28
(1981).
117 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 4 (1976); see also CODE, supra note
7, Canon 7B(1)(b). Appointment to the committee of an employee would authorize the
employee to solicit contributions and support, acts which are prohibited for the candi-
date, and which the candidate must also prohibit his or her employees from doing.
"I Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-30
(1981).
U, Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-52
(1985).
110 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
72-1 (1972).
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What happens when a member of an incumbent candidate's
committee appears before the candidate as a litigant or as an
attorney? Only one advisory opinion has explicitly addressed this
question, holding that Canons 1 and 2, concerning the integrity
of the judiciary and the appearance of judicial impropriety,
mandate that an incumbent candidate disqualify himself or her-
self under Canon 3C when a lawyer-committee member appears
in the candidate's court. 61 This is considered to be necessary
because the judge-candidate's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned in those circumstances. Such a result is supported by
ethics advisory opinions dealing with an analogous situation-
where an attorney representing a judge in other litigation appears
before the judge as a party or as attorney for a party. In this
situation, most jurisdictions take the view that the judge must
disqualify himself or herself,162 or at least disclose the relation-
ship and continue to hear the case only upon the consent of all
litigants and counsel. 63
The question of whether an incumbent candidate must also
recuse himself or herself when associates or partners of a mem-
ber of his or her campaign committee appear has never been
directly addressed. Several advisory opinions state that a judge
may not hear a case involving partners or associates of an
attorney who is representing the judge.'6 At least one opinion
finds that there is no per se rule requiring disqualification in
these circumstances, but that the judge may proceed only after
full disclosure and consent by all concerned. 165
161 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
(1982).
162 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-74 (1980), Advisory Op. 82-
168 (1982); Mo. Comm'n on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Op. 101 (1984); S.C.
Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 3-1983 (1983); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1477 (1981); see also
Comm. on Judicial. Ethics, Judicial Section, State Bar of Tex., Op. 6 (1975); Md.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 95 (1982).
163 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 3-1983
(1983).
,6, Mo. Comm'n on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Op. 101 (1984); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1477 (1981); N.Y. State
Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 511 (1979).
363 Fla, Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
79-2 (1979).
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Assuming that a judge cannot hear cases involving members
of his or her campaign committee during the campaign, the next
logical inquiry must be whether the necessity for disqualification
ceases at some point after the campaign has successfully been
completed. One opinion states, without further explanation, that
when an attorney serving or having served on a candidate's
campaign committee comes before the judge in his or her official
capacity, disqualification is required.'6 However, most opinions
concerning disqualification when a judge's personal attorney
appears in his or her court indicate that the need for disquali-
fication ends when the attorney-client relationship with the judge
is terminated. 167 And one opinion that takes the strong view that
a judge may not hear a case involving his or her former attorney,
and that this requirement continues, virtually ad infinitum, spe-
cifically states that a judge need not automatically recuse himself
or herself when attorneys "who are known to have actively
supported" the judge's candidacy appear in court. 168
A candidate may avoid such conflicts by deciding not to
form a committee. Campaign committees are not mandatory
under the Code. A candidate need not form a committee and
maintain a separate bank account if he or she will not accept
contributions and will only expend personal funds on a cam-
paign. 69 However, candidates who wish to use funds contributed
by others must do so through a committee.' 70 One jurisdiction
holds that this is true even if the candidate is seeking appoint-
ment to office, rather than election, and even though contribu-
tions will not be accepted from litigants, practicing attorneys or
others likely to come before the court.17' The evils sought to be
avoided by Canon 7B(2), which by its terms applies only to those
seeking election, are also deemed to be present where a candidate
seeks appointment. 72
16 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
(1982).
67 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 80-74 (1980); Mo. Comm'n on
Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Op. 101 (1984); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1477 (1981).
I" N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 511 (1979).
9 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 5 (1976).
,70 See CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2).
"I Or. Judicial Conference, Judicial Conduct Comm., Ethics Op. 78-2 (1978).
' Id.
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If limitations are to be placed on a judge's hearing cases in
which members of the judge's campaign committee are involved,
should similar limitations be placed on a judge's hearing cases
involving members of the campaign committee of the judge's
opponent? Although no advisory opinion has addressed this
question, the potential dangers are indicated by a recent Ala-
bama case in which a judge who had been an unsuccessful
candidate for a higher judicial post maintained a "hit list" of
supporters of his opponent. 173 The list was posted on the judge's
office wall and included attorneys and law firms that had con-
tributed to his opponent's campaign. Numerous attorneys ap-
pearing on the list moved for recusal in cases they had before
the judge, but all recusal motions were denied. Alabama's Court
of the Judiciary suspended the judge for six months for violating
Canons 1 and 2 of Alabama's Canons of Judicial Ethics.' 74
B. Solicitation of Funds
Different constraints are imposed upon the activities of cam-
paign committees, depending upon whether the candidate is seek-
ing an office filled by a public election between competing
candidates or is an incumbent seeking retention in or re-election
to office without a competing candidate. In the case of a public
election involving competing candidates, the Code states that a
campaign committee may be formed and may solicit contribu-
tions no earlier than ninety days before a primary election, and
no more than ninety days after the last election in which the
candidate participates.175 However, in the case of an incumbent
who is unopposed for re-election, or who is running for retention
under a merit plan system, the candidate's committee may not
begin to collect contributions until active opposition to the can-
didate has appeared. If opposition is encountered, then a corn-
'73 In re Epperson, COJ-19, Unreported Judgment (Ala. Ct. of the Jud., Feb. 23,
1987).
174 Id.
"I CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2). The time limits specified in this section of
the Model Code are merely suggestions. "Each jurisdiction adopting this Code should
prescribe a time limit on soliciting campaign funds that is appropriate to the elective
process therein." Id. Canon 7B(2) comment.
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mittee may solicit funds subject to the same time limits that
apply to competing candidates in public elections. 176
The period of time during which a campaign committee is
permitted to solicit contributions varies from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction. Only eleven states have adopted the ninety-day periods
suggested by the Code. 77 Eight states have adopted different
time limits, 178 and six states 179 and the District of Columbia have
placed no time limits on the period of solicitation.
Several jurisdictions have addressed questions arising from
the differing rules regarding campaign committees for candidates
competing with other candidates and for incumbents who do not
face competitors. One jurisdiction holds that an incumbent may
not establish a committee until opposition becomes apparent.' 80
Another takes a middle view that such a candidate may form a
committee prior to the emergence of opposition, but that the
committee may not solicit funds until opposition actually ap-
pears.'8 ' Finally, a third state holds that to require a candidate
to wait to form a committee until the candidacy has been op-
posed would be analogous to closing the barn door after the
cows had escaped. 82 Therefore, this state permits any candidate,
including unopposed incumbents, to establish a campaign com-
mittee and begin soliciting and collecting funds. 83
Provisions governing when solicitation may begin do not
affect the time when a candidate may begin to campaign. Ac-
cordingly, one jurisdiction permits the holding of a function
designed to allow voters to meet the candidate prior to the time
when solicitation is permitted, as long as no solicitation occurs
176 CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(3).
'77 Alaska, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming.
,-' Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Washington.
,7, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, West Virginia.
- S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
(1982).
"I Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 78-1(3) (1978).
In Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-11 (1978).
"I Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
76-15 (1976), Op. 78-11 (1978).
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at the function. 184 This ruling further states that no violation of
the fundraising restrictions would occur if food was served and
those attending such a function were required to pay for their
own meals, but that it would be improper to hold a function
with no fixed cost which might yield a profit, before the solici-
tation period begins. 185 When a campaign fundraiser is to be
held shortly after the solicitation period commences, one juris-
diction has taken the position that the event cannot be publicly
announced nor any tickets be sold prior to the beginning of the
solicitation period.'16
Some jurisdictions permit fundraising to continue for a pe-
riod of time after an election to defray campaign debts.187 Other
jurisdictions dictate that fundraising must cease on the date of
the election.18 8 In one state that has adopted the latter view, an
ethics opinion holds that the candidate may nevertheless contrib-
ute personal funds to his or her campaign committee after the
election to the extent necessary to pay outstanding campaign
debts.189
Until recently, Georgia's Code of Judicial Conduct prohib-
ited post-election solicitation.190 An unsuccessful candidate for
judicial office challenged that provision, and a trial court ruled
that the state supreme court lacked the authority to promulgate
Canon 7B(2) and that the canon violated the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. In Judicial Qual-
ifications Commission v. Lowenstein,191 the Georgia Supreme
'1 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-42
(1983).
185 Id.
186 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 22 (1978).
117 See, e.g., Judicial Qualification Comm'n v. Lowenstein, 314 S.E. 107 (Ga.
1984).
"I See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Informal Op. CI-386 (1979).
189 Id.
11o Until March of 1984, Georgia's Code of Judicial Conduct provided: "A candi-
date's committee may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than six months before
a primary election and no later than the date of the last contested primary or election
in which he participates during that election year." Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct,
231 Ga. A-i; 232 Ga. 901; 238 Ga. 855; 245 Ga. 885. On March 15, 1984 the Georgia
Code was amended to eliminate all time limitations on the solicitation of funds. 251 Ga.
897 (1984).
191 314 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 1984) (challenging constitutionality of campaign fund-raising
restrictions in Canon 7B(2) of Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct).
[VOL. 77
ETIcAL CONSTRAINTS
Court ruled that it had inherent authority to promulgate rules
governing judicial officers. 192 The court further stated that the
question of the constitutionality of the canon was moot, as it
has subsequently been amended to delete fundraising restric-
tions. '9
Several states impose no restrictions on the time when cam-
paign contributions may be solicited. Ethics opinions in these
states provide varying views on the propriety of fundraising after
an election. Louisiana permits a testimonial fundraiser to defray
a campaign deficit "within a reasonable time" after the elec-
tion.' 94 Missouri permits solicitation and fundraising events to
continue until a campaign deficit is paid, 195 and Alabama takes
a similar view. 96 Texas permits a judge to conduct a fundraising
benefit in a non-election year as long as its purpose does not
violate any provisions of the Code.' 97
A distinction should be made between solicitation of funds
and their acceptance. Although it may be improper for a com-
mittee to solicit funds outside of a certain period of time, it is
not necessarily improper to accept unsolicited contributions prof-
fered when solicitation is prohibited. 19
As noted, Canon 7B(2) of the Code prohibits candidates for
judicial office from personally soliciting campaign contribu-
tions.199 At least two judges have been publicly reprimanded for
M Id. at 108.
193 Id.
19, La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973).
,91 Mo. Comm'n on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Op. 93 (1983).
19 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 82-147 (1982).
117 Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Judicial Section, State Bar of Tex., Op. 56 (1981).
I" Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-42
(1983); see also Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges,
Op. 82-10 (1982).
'99 CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2).
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is
filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself
solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he
may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the
expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of
support for his candidacy.
Id. See also State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal
Op. CI-509 (1980); N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289
(1973); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
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personally contacting members of the bar and asking for cam-
paign contributions. 200 One of these judges was disciplined de-
spite his having assured the attorney he solicited that a
contribution, or lack thereof, would have no effect on cases the
attorney or his firm had pending in the candidate's court.20 1
Questions may arise concerning what constitutes "solicita-
tion." A Kentucky ethics opinion indicates that the word solicit
has its ordinary dictionary meaning: to ask for something.202
Another state has stated that it would be improper for an
incumbent candidate to write letters inviting people to a fun-
draiser, or to place newspaper advertisements concerning ticket
information for a fundraiser. 20 3 An ethics advisory committee in
Florida takes a more liberal view, holding that a candidate may
properly write a letter to local attorneys concluding by saying,
"I now personally solicit your vote and your Active support. ' '204
However, the same opinion finds that it would be improper for
the candidate to add a postscript specifically asking for financial
contributions, or to enclose a card for recipients to return with
a contribution. 205 The Florida committee also has stated that it
would not be a violation of Canon 7B(2) for a candidate to
write letters to all financial contributors to his upcoming cam-
paign personally thanking them for their assistance.2°6
-Canon 7B(2) of the Code establishes time limits during which
campaign committees may solicit funds, and states that such
committees "are not prohibited from soliciting campaign con-
tributions ... from lawyers," but does not set forth further
(1982). Candidate's immediate families are also prohibited from personally soliciting
campaign funds pursuant to Canon 7B(1)(a) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
the South Dakota Campaign Guidelines, and N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
In re Lantz, 402 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1981); In re Hotchkiss, 327 N.W.2d 312
(Mich. 1982).
Hotchkiss, 327 N.W.2d 312.
Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-42
(1983).
"I La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973), Op. 13 (1973).
204 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-1 (1978).
205 Id.
SFla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
77-22 (1978).
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specific limitations on the fundraising activities of campaign
committees. 20 Further elaboration of the restrictions imposed on
campaign committees is left to ethics advisory opinions and state
guidelines for judicial campaigns. Guidelines used in some juris-
dictions state:
Contributions for a campaign for judicial office may not be
knowingly solicited or accepted from a party, or one employed
by, affiliated with or a member of the immediate family of a
party, to litigation that (a) is before the candidate, (b) may
reasonably be expected to come before him if he is elected, or
(c) has come before him so recently that the knowing solici-
tation or acceptance of funds may give the appearance of
improper use of the power or prestige of judicial office. Sim-
ilarly, contributions may not be knowingly solicited or accepted
from any firm, corporation or other organization that has as
one of its purposes the promotion of one side of a legal issue
which may reasonably be expected to come before the candi-
date if he is elected. 208
These guidelines also address the propriety of solicitation of
contributions from lawyers:
Contributions may be solicited and accepted from lawyers
(including lawyers having cases before, or which may come
before, the candidate), provided that the solicitation makes no
reference, direct or indirect, to any particular pending or po-
tential litigation. Because lawyers may be better able than
laymen to appraise accurately the qualifications of candidates
for judicial office, it would not be appropriate... to prohibit
solicitation of lawyers who may appear before the candidate. 2°9
In New York, the campaign guidelines add that contributions
should not knowingly be accepted by an incumbent candidate
for a trial court judgeship from attorneys with cases before the
candidate, nor should lawyers contribute to such a candidate if
they have cases pending in the candidate's court.210
CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2).
Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Campaigns, 4B SDCL Appendix Ch. 12-9 (1982);
N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
2m Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Campaigns, 4B SDCL Appendix Ch. 12-9 (1982).
210 N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
1988-89]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Some states have adopted versions of Canon 7 that delineate
restrictions on the activities of campaign committees. The Mi-
chigan Code of Judicial Conduct contains five subsections to
Canon 7B(2). Section (c) states, in part, that a committee is
"prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions from lawyers
in excess of $100 per lawyer. ' 21' An ethics advisory committee
in Michigan has opined that it is presently unclear whether
lawyers may be solicited for an additional contribution for a
general election if they have already given $100 to a candidate
in a primary election. 212
The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct also limits campaign
solicitations, stating that a committee "should not, directly or
indirectly, solicit or receive any assessment, subscription, or
contribution for any political or personal purpose whatever from
any employee, appointee of the court or anyone who does busi-
ness with the court but may solicit campaign contributions from
lawyers. "213 Commentary indicates that "appointees of the court
include officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters,
receivers, guardians, appraisers and personnel such as clerks,
secretaries, bailiffs, and all other employees and appointees. ' 214
Although the Ohio Code permits solicitation of lawyers in gen-
eral, it does not indicate whether lawyers involved in cases
pending before a candidate may be solicited for contributions
by the candidate's campaign committee. It is conceivable that
such lawyers would be considered persons who do "business
with the court" and thus are ineligible to be contributors.
C. Donations
On the other side of the solicitation coin lies the issue of
donations. Who may donate to a candidate's campaign; how
21, Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Michigan Court Rules 1319 (West Supp.
1983).
2 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-574 (1980).
213 Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B)(2), 36 Ohio St. 2d.
214 Id. Technically, this commentary applies only to Canon 7B(3), prohibiting
solicitation or receipt of monies by a candidate. However, the language used to describe
persons from whom a candidate may not solicit money is the same as the language used
in Canon 7B(2), which limits persons from whom the committee may receive money.
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much may be donated; and what effect does the creation of a
candidate-donor relationship have on pending or future cases
involving both parties?
In the absence of more restrictive provisions contained in a
state's version of the Code of Judicial Conduct or election law,
the general rule is that any person or group may donate a
reasonable amount of money or time to the campaign of a
candidate for judicial office, as long as the contributor does not
expect to receive any direct benefit from the candidate's election.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, by permitting campaign com-
mittees to solicit contributions from lawyers, 2 5 implicitly au-
thorizes lawyers to offer donations and candidates to accept
them. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, in Dis-
ciplinary Rule 7-110(A), states that a lawyer may make a con-
tribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office.
It is clear, however, that the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility does not permit lawyers to give anything to judges
or candidates for judicial office with the intention of influencing
their official actions.21 6 The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct do not specifically authorize lawyer contributions to judicial
campaigns, but the Rules do indicate that lawyers may not
contribute money in an attempt to influence a judge's official
actions .217
23s CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2) ("Such [campaign] committees are not pro-
hibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers.").
"6 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 7-110 (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILTY EC 7-34 (1969).
A lawyer shall not give or lend anything of value to a judge, official, or
employee of a tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but a lawyer may make a contribution
to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office in conformity with
Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY DR 7-110(A) (1983).
The impartiality of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired
by the receipt of gifts or loans. A lawyer, therefore, is never justified in
making a gift or a loan to a judge, a hearing officer, or an official or
employee of a tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but a lawyer may make a contribution
to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office in conformity with
Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONslBITY EC 7-34 (1969).
237 MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.5, 8.4 (1983). "A lawyer shall
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Some interpretation of these black-letter rules is provided by
ethics advisory opinions and formal guidelines for judicial cam-
paigns. Several state's ethics committees have issued opinions
stating that campaign contributions to candidates for judicial
office from lawyers or law firms are not only proper, but are
to be encouraged.218 Such contributions are permissible whenever
the cost of a reasonably conducted campaign will likely exceed
an amount that the candidate could be personally expected to
bear, 2 9 and such contributions may be ethically accepted by a
campaign committee even though the contributor is an attorney
who is likely to appear before a successful candidate, as long as
they are offered and accepted without any expectation that the
contributor will be rewardedY 0 However, the total amount of
donations should not exceed the needs of the campaign. A
campaign committee should not accept an amount from a single
source, other than the candidate or the candidate's family, that
is so large as to foster an appearance that the donor is seeking
favored treatment. Moreover, a contribution from a person other
than a member of a candidate's family should not be accepted
if the amount appears to be out of proportion to the contribu-
tor's financial resources or to the total amount expected to be
raised for the campaign.221
Some potential problem areas remain concerning donations
to candidates for judicial office. Contributions by persons or
groups representing a particular point of view, such as opposi-
tion to abortion or to capital punishment, may receive significant
public attention and lead to later perceptions of favoritism, even
where a candidate is not supposed to know the identity of
financial contributors. Candidates and their committees may
therefore find it judicious to avoid receiving contributions from
donors espousing particular ideologies.
not: (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means
prohibited by law." Id. at Rule 3.5(a). "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
... (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law." Id. at Rule 8.4(0.
218 Ky. Bar Association Ethics Comm., Op. E-277 (1984); Fla. Supreme Court
Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 80-9 (1980), Op. 82-10 (1982);
N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
2,, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 226 (1941).
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Judicial Section, State Bar of Tex., Op. 48.
221 N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
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Because campaigns for public office are likely to involve
deficit spending, candidates for judicial office or their commit-
tees may find it necessary to borrow to meet expenses. Both the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility contain provisions indicating that a can-
didate may need to be cautious when choosing a lender to
provide campaign funds. Canon 5C(4)(c) states that a judge may
accept a loan only if the lender is not a party or other person
whose interests have come or are likely to come before the
judge.m This prohibition generally precludes receipt of loans
from attorneys who practice in the judge's court.2 Disciplinary
Rule 7-110(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
also prohibits loans to judges by attorneys. At the very least,
these rules indicate that it is improper for a candidate to per-
sonally negotiate a loan for campaign purposes from an attorney
or other person who will appear before the candidate if he or
she is elected. By its terms, DR 7-110(A) does not apply to loans
made to a campaign committee, but an argument could be made
that local practicing attorneys should not make loans to candi-
dates' campaign committees, or that the judges should recuse
themselves when they have actual knowledge that an attorney in
a case before the court has made a substantial loan to their
campaign.22
A judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept
any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or
other person whose interests have come or are likely to come before him,
and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the same manner as
he reports compensation in Canon 6C.
CODE, supra note 7, Canon 5C(4)(c).
2n See In re Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Minn. 1977) (holding that accepting
loans from members of bar, failure to file requested informational reports, and failure
to timely decide matters submitted constitutes judicial misconduct justifying suspension
without pay for three months).
2U4
A lawyer shall not give or lend anything of value to a judge, official, or
employee of a tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but a lawyer may make a contribution
to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office in conformity with
Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL REsPoNsiBELT DR 7-110(A) (1983).
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Some states impose limits on donations to candidates for
judicial office, or to their committee, either as part of state
ethical standards or through other laws. Ohio limits the persons
who are eligible to contribute to a campaign for judicial office.22
Under the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, judicial cam-
paign committees cannot solicit contributions from lawyers in
excess of $100.226 However, two state ethics advisory opinions
indicate that campaign committees may accept unsolicited in-
kind or monetary contributions from lawyers larger than that
amount. 2 7 Other states limit sources or amounts of contributions
by statute.22s
Another question that may arise if a candidate is successful
is whether the judge must disqualify himself or herself when
financial contributors appear in court. The Code of Judicial
Conduct requires recusal of a judge whenever the judge's im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned by an ordinary reason-
able person with knowledge of all the facts.229 However, no
court or ethics advisory committee has found that contribution
to a judge's campaign, standing alone, is sufficient to merit
recusal when a contributor later appears in court.20 Further, the
only two ethics advisory opinions that have considered the matter
hold that it is not necessary for a judge to disclose to other
attorneys or parties when one party or attorney contributed to
the judge's campaign. 23' Finally, ethics opinions indicate that
while a candidate-supporter relationship alone does not require
automatic disqualification, a case-by-case evaluation (by the judge
' See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
22 Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7B(2)(c); see also State Bar of Mich.
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-352 (1978).
2 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-509 (1980), Informal Op. CI-531 (1980).
E.g., Mississippi Corrupt Practices Act; Miss. CODE ANN. 23-6-25 (1972); see
also THE CouNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 25 Tan BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-85, 192-
96 (1984).
2 CODE, supra note 7B(1)(a).
230 See Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-213 (1984), Advisory Op.
84-227 (1985); Ill. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 866 (1984);
N.Y. State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 511 (1979); Fla. Supreme
Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-7 (1978).
23 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-227 (1984); Fa. Supreme Court
Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-7 (1978).
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involved) is necessary to determine whether this relationship
combined with other factors may cause the judge's impartiality
to be reasonably open to question.232
D. Permissible Fundraising Functions and Events
A campaign committee may sponsor a fundraising benefit to
raise money for campaign expenses provided that the nature and
type of event does not compromise the candidate's integrity,
independence in future judicial affairs or give the appearance of
impropriety.233 Permissible events include dinners for which a
fee is charged or at which contributions are sought, 234 testimon-
ials, 235 or other events designed to promote the candidacy.23 6
Even the use of raffles has been approved, 237 but only where it
does not violate state law.238 Such events should be advertised
and held during the period when solicitation is permitted. 239 The
candidate should not personally solicit people to attend, 2  nor
should he or she make a plea for contributions during the
event.2'
The Code suggests that a candidate should not be informed
of the identities of contributors to his or her campaign. 242 In
jurisdictions adhering to this rule, tickets to fundraisers should
not be numbered, and the candidate should not be informed of
those who purchase tickets or make donations during an event.2 3
"I Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Advisory Op. 84-213 (1984), Advisory Op. 84-
227 (1984).
" Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Judicial Section, State Bar of Tex., Op. 55 (1981);
see also CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(1)(a).
21 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 7 (1976).
233 La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973).
"6 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 22 (1978).
23 La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 56 (1982).
238 Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Administrative Office of the Courts, Op. JE-46
(1983).
29 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 7 (1976); Ga. Judicial Qualifications
Comm'n, Op. 22 (1978); La. Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op, 11 (1973).
m La, Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973).
24 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 7 (1976).
22 CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2) comment. "Unless the candidate is required
by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to
the candidate." Id.
2,3 Numbering solicitations or tickets to fundraising events may create the perception
that a record is kept of those who attend that is passed along to the candidate. La.
Supreme Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973), Op. 56 (1973).
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Several advisory opinions suggest that candidates should not
attend fundraising events for which a ticket must be purchased
by those in attendance, because this would bring the candidate
into direct contact with contributors and provide certain knowl-
edge of their identities.244 If no fee is charged for attendance,
candidates sometimes appear at a fundraising event, but leave
before any donations are solicited. 2A5
E. Use of Campaign Funds
Funds raised by a campaign committee will be used, in most
instances, for advertising in the print and broadcast media,
brochures and materials for distribution, travel expenses, tele-
phone expenses, administrative expenses and other costs incurred
in promoting the candidacy. The Code merely requires that
campaign contributions not be used for the private benefit of a
candidate or the candidate's family,2" and places no other res-
trictions on the use of campaign funds.
One ethics advisory opinion holds that a candidate who is
unopposed may not form a finance committee to raise funds to
pay a qualifying fee. 247 Opinions in another state have held that
it is proper for a candidate who is unopposed to accept contri-
butions to cover the expenses of filing for election, but several
members of the committee issuing those opinions did not agree
with the majority view and suggested that an unopposed candi-
date should not raise or use campaign funds for that purpose.24
Finally, a third state takes the view that a candidate for judicial
office, opposed or unopposed, incumbent or not, may raise
funds and use them to pay a qualifying fee, so long as the funds
are raised during the period when solicitation is permitted. 249
2, Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 7 (1976), Op. 22 (1978); La. Supreme
Court Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 11 (1973).
2s Tenth Annual Report, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct 77
(1985).
'' CODE, supra note 7, Canon 7B(2). "A candidate should not use or permit the
use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his
family." Id.
241 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 5-1982
(1982).
Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
78-11 (1978), Op. 82-10 (1982).
241 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 41 (1980).
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Candidates often lend money to their campaign committees.
No case or advisory opinion has ever suggested that it is im-
proper to use campaign funds to repay such loans, or that such
repayment would constitute a prohibited "private benefit" for
the candidate. One opinion does state, however, that a candidate
who loaned his campaign committee money in one election could
not properly be repaid using funds raised during a subsequent
election campaign. Any excess funds from the subsequent cam-
paign, said the opinion, must be disposed of as prescribed by
the state Code of Judicial Conduct. 210
Two judges have been disciplined for using campaign funds
for personal purposes. An incumbent New York judge was found
to have violated Canon 5C(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(prohibiting receipt of gifts from persons appearing before a
judge) when he used for personal expenditures more than $10,000
raised during a campaign "testimonial" from attorneys who
practiced in his court and persons who had appeared in his court
as litigants. 251 The judge was admonished for this conduct. A
Michigan judge was publicly censured, suspended from office
for nine months without pay, and ordered to pay costs of the
discipline proceedings after he violated Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 7B(2) by diverting contributions to his campaign com-
mittee into an "expense fund" used for his own purposes. 252
Campaign committees sometimes find, after paying all ex-
penses of a campaign, that an excess remains in the treasury.
Since Canon 7B(2) prohibits personal use of such excess money
by the candidate, it cannot be turned over to the candidate and
must be disposed of in some other manner. 253 Florida advisory
opinions state that a candidate's committee may retain surplus
funds for use in the next election, or may donate the surplus
funds to charity. 254 A Missouri advisory opinion specifies that
2" State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-1040 (1984).
2, In re Certo, Unreported Determination (N.Y. Comm'n 1982).
212 In re Lawrence, 335 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1983).
21 Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
83-1 (1983) (under Florida law, a county or circuit judge may transfer as much as $1,500
into his or her office account).
- Fla. Supreme Court Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
83-1 (1983), Op. 77-5 (1977). The latter opinion notes that a donation to charity should
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any excess campaign funds must be returned to contributors on
a pro-rata basis, but notes that expenses of administering the
refund may be paid out of the surplus funds.255 The Michigan
Code of Judicial Conduct requires candidates either to return
any excess funds to the contributors or to donate those funds
to the Client Security Fund of the State Bar of Michigan, not
later than the end of the year in which the election was held.2 6
This rule precludes donation of excess funds to charity.257
CONCLUSION
This review of the ethics rules and the case law and advisory
opinions interpreting them raises serious questions about the
efficacy of Canon 7 of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. It suggests that the Code falls short of achieving the
goals of faithfulness to the electoral process and maintenance of
the appearance of judicial impartiality. Code restrictions on
campaign appearances and advocacy have tended to be inter-
preted in a manner that precludes presentation of meaningful
information on judicial candidates to the electorate; and, Code
restrictions on campaign financing tend to raise more questions
about judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality
than they answer.
Ethical restrictions on campaign appearances and advocacy
severely limit information on judicial candidates that may be
presented to the electorate. The Code has been interpreted to
prevent public debates between competing candidates, 258 to pro-
hibit statements concerning a candidate's anticipated conduct in
office (other than general statements promising the faithful per-
formance of duties), 259 to prevent or curtail responses to ques-
not be followed by the candidate's claim of a charitable deduction on his or her personal
income tax return.
21 Mo. Comm'n on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Op. 18 (1979).
256 Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7B(2)(d) and (e), Michigan Court
Rules (West Supp. 1983); State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Informal Op. CI-1040 (1984).
"5 State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op.
CI-664 (1981).
21 See supra note 53.
01 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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tionnaire surveys of candidates' views 260 and to preclude
statements concerning the candidate's performance or the per-
formance of the candidate's opponent other than those relating
to court administration. 261 In short, the electorate has inadequate
information to judge the judges. 262 For these and other reasons,
judicial elections have been characterized as "quasi-elections. '26
One way in which judicial "quasi-elections" emulate election
contests of other elected officials is their cost. Judicial election
campaign costs have escalated in recent years. 26 Although Canon
7B(2) of the Code seeks to insulate the judicial candidate from
campaign fundraising and knowledge of the identity of contrib-
utors through the use of campaign committees, this protection
is rendered somewhat ineffectual by state campaign financing
disclosure laws. 265 Although judges may not personally solicit
campaign funds, they tend to know who their contributors are.
The use of campaign financing committees, coupled with the
knowledge of the identity of campaign contributors, brings a
judge's impartiality into question. However, there are no clear
rules to restore the appearance of impartiality. It is unclear
whether a judge may hear a case in which a member of the
judge's campaign committee or one associated with the commit-
tee member is involved as a litigant or as an attorney. 266 It is
less clear whether a judge may hear a case involving contributors
to the campaign of the judge's opponent or members of the
opponent's campaign committee.26 7 Although a restrictive rule
that would disqualify a judge from sitting in such cases might
w See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
26' For recent proposals to lift restrictions on campaign speech by judicial candi-
dates, see Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. Rnv. 207 (1988); Comment,
First Amendment Rights of Attorneys and Judges in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47
Omo ST. L.J. 201 (1986).
u" Schotland, supra note 1, at 83.
" For discussions of the costs of judicial election campaigns, see Schotland, supra
note 1, at 59-65; Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign
Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REv. 449, 452-55 (1988).
-1 For a critique of Canon 7B(2) in operation, see Banner, supra note 264.
2" See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
- For the potential dangers involved in allowing judges to participate in such cases,
see supra note 164.
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be advisable from the standpoint of maintaining the appearance
of impartiality, such a rule could have adverse consequences
from an administration of justice standpoint. In less populous
communities, to ban the judge from sitting in cases involving
both campaign supporters and opponents in order to preserve
the appearance of impartiality might result in the judge's dis-
qualification in a large percentage of cases filed in the judge's
court. Attempts by the organized bar to implement campaign
financing plans that would address these problems have proved
largely unsuccessful. 268
Therefore, while Canon 7 of the ABA's Code of Judicial
Conduct may appear to represent a sensible approach to curbing
judicial election campaign abuses, a closer analysis of the oper-
ation of the Canon reveals significant shortcomings. Such an
analysis tends to support the succinct statement of a prominent
political commentator earlier in this century that, "for the elec-
tion of judges by popular vote there is nothing to be said." 269
Although some states have abandoned judicial elections in
favor of the "merit plan" for selecting judges, most states still
choose all or some of their judges through popular election. It
is, therefore, imperative that the problem caused by judicial
elections be addressed in a meaningful way.
Drafters of judicial ethics codes and others concerned about
the problem of judicial elections might first take note of its
polycentric character. As we have seen, efforts to correct one
aspect of the problem are likely to have an adverse effect on
others. For example, an attempt to sanitize campaign conduct
by curbing campaign speech may assist in maintaining the ap-
pearance of impartiality but it detracts from the goal of faith-
fulness to the electoral process because it severely limits the
information the electorate may obtain about a candidate's views.
Because the problem of judicial elections is polycentric, it is
more appropriate to deal with it through local direction and
" For a review of three bar reform efforts, see Schotland, supra note 1, at 96-
107.
269 Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MicH. L. REv. 529, 531
(1926).
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control than through the application of state-wide ethics rules.270
A local program aimed at controlling campaign abuses by estab-
lishing local ground rules for individual campaigns and then
monitoring these campaigns would appear to be in a much better
position to fashion appropriate responses to questions concern-
ing campaign conduct and financing than a state-wide body
applying state-wide rules in piecemeal fashion. As we have seen,
the latter approach-necessitated by the current wording of Canon
7-has proven woefully inadequate.
Although local programs to control campaign abuses have
been established,27' the experiences of these programs have not
been systematically evaluated. Assessments of the experiences of
these programs would be of great assistance to those seeking
guidance in dealing with this problem. If these local programs
are found to have achieved a measure of success, Canon 7 should
be revised. The wording of Canon 7 might then be limited to
(1) offer general guidance to the judge (e.g., a judge should
avoid political activity that may give rise to an appearance of
bias) and (2) account for, or encourage the establishment of,
local plans to monitor and control specific campaign conduct.
Localizing Canon 7 in this way would increase the likelihood of
270 In arguing that adjudication is ill-suited for dealing with a polycentric problem,
Lou Fuller argues that the only adequate methods for handling polycentric problems are
managerial direction and contract. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARv. L. Rev. 353, 398 (1978).
271 One example of such a program is the "Fair Election Practices Committee for
Judicial Campaigns" of the San Mateo County (California) Bar Association:
The Fair Election Practices Committee for Judicial Campaigns provides a
resource and a hearing forum for a candidate who might be the victim of
an opponent's false or misleading statements. It also provides a forum for
the truthfulness of a candidate's allegations. It is the obligation of the
Committee to assist candidates in an advisory capacity. The Committee is
constituted in such a fashion that it can act swiftly in the event of untruth-
ful or misleading statements by a candidate as to his qualifications or as
to the qualifications of his opponent.
The Committee recognizes that a contested election for judicial office is
still a political contest and fully embraces the concepts of free speech and
fair comment. The Committee also realizes that during the heat of a
campaign candidates may be the subject of vicious, untruthful and libelous
statements against which they have no adequate remedy except by an
immediate reference of a neutral committee, which is then empowered to
provide a prompt public response.
San Mateo County (Calif.) Bar Association, Plan for Judicial Campaigns (1985).
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accomplishing the goals of an impartial judiciary and faithful-
ness to the electoral process.
